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THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: MORE THAN A
CAMiO APPEARANCE IN UNITED STATES
ENvoNMENTA LAW?
PHILLIP M. KANNAN*
Sing me no song! Read me no rhyme!
Don't waste my time; Show me!1
INTRODUCTION
At its core, the precautionary principle is a risk management theory
that elaborates on the simple command "show me." It decides whether the
regulator or the regulated must be "shown." It decides whether "show"
means proof to a scientific certainty or scientific consensus, a scintilla of
evidence, a wild hunch, or some other standard. It decides when the
showing is to start, when it must be completed, what the consequences of
not showing are, what roles the regulators and the regulated have in the
process of showing, whether minimizing false positives2 or false negatives3
Distinguished Lecturer and Legal-Scholar-in-Residence, Colorado College.
1 ALAN JAY LERNER & FREDERICK LOEWE, Show Me, in MY FAIR LADY (1956).
2 The definition of "false positive" used for medical tests is: "A test result that indicates
that a person has a specific disease or condition when the person actually does not have
the disease or condition." National Cancer Institute, Dictionary of Cancer Terms, Def-
inition of False-Positive Test Result, http://www.cancer.gov/Templates/db-alpha.aspx
?CdrID=340929 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). By analogue, a false positive in governmental
matters is a decision by a governmental body based on judgment, data, and policy to
control a phenomenon, product, or process when the phenomenon, product or process
actually does not cause the harm the governmental body seeks to manage. False positives
are also called type I errors or alpha errors. See National Water Quality Laboratory,
United States Geological Service, Long-Term Method Detection Level and Laboratory
Reporting Level Information: Glossary, http://nwql.usgs.gov/Public/ltmdl/glossary.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
' The definition of "false negative" used for medical tests is: "A test result that indicates
that a person does not have a specific disease or condition when the person actually does
have the disease or condition." National Cancer Institute, Dictionary of Cancer Terms,
Definition of False-Negative Test Result, httpJ/www.cancer.gov/Templates/db-alpha.aspx
?CdrID=340928 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007). By analogue, a false negative in governmental
matters is a decision by a governmental body based on judgment, data, and policy not to
control a phenomenon, product, or process when the phenomenon, product or process
actually does cause the harm the governmental body seeks to manage. False negatives
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is to be the goal of the showing, and whether showing should protect the
public interest primarily under a liability model or a preventive model.
The elaboration on "show me" will take place in an atmosphere of
uncertainty: health and environmental risks will not be fully understood,
economic impacts will not be clear, and political fallout will be uncertain.
Moreover, the answer to all the questions that the process poses will take
place in a contentious mix of competing values: environmental, economic,
developmental, religious, and political.
Consider the question of whether the federal government should
prohibit logging of old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest in order to
protect the northern spotted owl. The Forest Service issued proposed man-
agement guidelines for protecting this habitat.4 However, neither the
timber industry nor environmentalists were satisfied with them.5 In-
dustry claimed the guidelines would eliminate thousands of jobs, while
environmentalists argued that the guidelines could cause the extinction
of the owl in twenty-five years.6 The studies that had been performed
could not determine with scientific certainty the number of acres of old
growth forest each pair of owls required.7 The Forest Service was faced
with the dilemma of whether to side with industry and allow unre-
stricted logging while further data were collected or to restrict logging
while further scientific studies were completed.' The former choice could
well lead to data, but no owls.9
I. REGULATING RISK
At least conceptually, the regulation of risk is broken into two steps:
risk assessment and risk management.1" The goal of risk assessment is
are also called type II errors or beta errors. See National Water Quality Laboratory,
supra note 2.
4 CHARLES f. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE
OF THE WEST 160-67 (1992).51d.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 164.
8 See id. at 164-65.
9 Id.
o COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE
PROCESS 2-3 (1983) [hereinafter RISKASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT] (stating
that one objective of the study on public health risks was "[t]o assess the merits of
separating the analytic function of developing risk assessment from the regulatory
functions of making policy decisions").
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to measure the overall magnitude of the risk taking into account prob-
ability of harm, pathways of causing harm, and size of at-risk pop-
ulation." Risk assessment is based on scientific inquiry, but almost
inevitably there is insufficient data to assess the risk to a scientific cer-
tainty. This will lead to the introduction of personal and professional judg-
ments into the assessment process. 2 For example, if the only data
available about the relationship between the dose of a particular chemical
to the response it causes are high doses administered to mice, judgments
must be made regarding how to translate that data into a dose-response
curve for humans and how to extrapolate from high doses to low doses. 3
The assessment process can result in either a quantitative measure of the
risk or a qualitative description, such as substantial risk or high risk,
depending on the purpose of the assessment and the availability of data.14
Once the risk assessment has been completed or has progressed
to a point that raises public or special interest concern, governments are
faced with the question of how to respond. For example, the government
faced a question of this nature when data showed that eighty-seven
deaths had been caused by the deployment of airbags as of November 1,
1997.'" The government could have responded by: requiring the disclosure
of the number of deaths, leaving it up to automobile manufacturers,
buyers, and owners to devise responses; taking no position and leaving
llId.
12 At each risk assessment step,
a number of decision points (components) occur where risk to human
health can only be inferred from the available evidence. Both scientific
judgments and policy choices may be involved in selecting from among
possible inferential bridges, and we have used the term risk assessment
policy to differentiate those judgments and choices from the broader
social and economic policy issues that are inherent in risk management
decisions.
Id.
13 Id. at 4 (illustrating inference guidelines with the following example: "a guideline
might specify the mathematical model to be used to estimate the effects of exposure at
low doses on the basis of the effects of exposure at high doses").
14 See Food and Drug Administration, Risk Assessment for Food Terrorism and Other
Food Safety Concerns (Oct. 7, 2003), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/rabtact.html (dis-
cussing the difference between quantitative and qualitative risk assessment and stating
that "[the agency has determined that [a] qualitative risk assessment, which discusses
prior incidents of food contamination and available unclassified information on prior acts
of food sabotage, is appropriate to the circumstances").
" Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406 (Nov. 21, 1997) (stating that "current air
bags [have] saved about 2,620 drivers and passengers, as of November 1, 1997[;]
[hiowever, those air bags had also caused the death of 87 people in low speed crashes, as
of that same date").
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it up to products liability litigation; requiring a redesign of airbags to
eliminate the risk; requiring an on-off switch for airbags; or by taking no
action until further studies enabled more reliable estimates of the risk.
Each alternative is clouded by uncertainty concerning the cost and the
number of lives to be lost or saved with any response. The choice of
response, like all risk management decisions, is heavily influenced by the
values the government decides to protect. 6
There are many theories or principles, including the precaution-
ary principle, that can be applied to risk management decisions. In each,
the decision maker attempts to integrate a broad spectrum of interests
and values, including scientific, economic, political, and social concerns,
into the risk management regime, particularly when there is significant
uncertainty or significant risk of irreversible harm. The various risk
management principles are determined by the relative weights assigned
to the competing interests and values.'7
The Supreme Court's opinions in Rapanos v. United States" illus-
trate how risk management is controlled by assigning different weights to
competing values. The risk posed in Rapanos was to "the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters" caused by the destruction
1 Id. The final rule allowed vehicle owners to petition the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration for a letter approving the installation of an on-off switch for air bags. Id.
Without such a determination, on-off switches cannot be installed. Id. See also National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Air Bag On-Off Switch, http'//www.nhtsa.dot .gov/
cars/testing/ncap/airbags/pages/FAQsABOnOff.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007); Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, Notice to Readers: Approval of Installation ofAir Bag On-
Off Switches For Certain Motor-Vehicle Owners, 46 MoRBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
1098, 1098-99 (1997), available at httpJ/ftp.cdc.gov/pub/publications/mmwr/wk/mm4646
.pdf (summarizing and expressing approval of the final rule).
" See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006). In this case, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit explained that:
Congress does not require the Administrator to exercise his discretion
solely on the basis of his assessment of scientific evidence. What the
Ethyl court called policy judgments also may be taken into account. By
this the court meant the sort of policyjudgments Congress makes when
it decides whether to enact legislation regulating a particular area.
Id. (citation omitted). For a critique of the application of this principle to the Environmental
Protection Agency's ("EPA") refusal to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles, but
not of the principle itself, see D.C. Circuit Shields Environmental Protection Agency from
Making Controversial Determination of Climate Endangerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2620,
2620 (2006) (stating that "[bly twisting the facts of the case and stretching precedent, the
opinion effectively limits the EPA's accountability to both the public and Congress").
'8 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
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of wetlands. 9 The Court considered whether four wetlands that are
connected by ditches or drains to creeks that empty into a navigable river
are navigable, and therefore protected, under the Clean Water Act.2 °
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, made it clear from the
outset of his opinion that property rights were the predominate interest
in his risk management analysis.2' He likened the Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") to an "enlightened despot" exercising discretion over
the development of "270-300 million acres of swampy lands" by consider-
ing "in general, the needs and welfare of the people."22 To further reduce
the significance of the Corps, Justice Scalia framed the Corps' regulation
of these wetlands as "a significant impingement of the States' traditional
and primary power over land and water uses."23 For risk management
regulation, this means that the expertise of the Corps will be ignored, the
federal interest will be dismissed, and the interest of the public will
count for little or nothing. Scalia elevated the interest of the landowner
in this case by casting him in the role of the victim of an over-reaching
government, stating that "for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos
faced 63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in crimi-
nal and civil fines."24 Not surprisingly, the plurality adopted a risk man-
agement rule that will under-protect the environmental conditions of the
waters of the United States:
In sum, on its only plausible interpretation, the phrase
"the waters of the United States" includes only those
relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing
bodies of water "forming geographic features" that are
described in ordinary parlance as "streams[,] ... oceans,
rivers, [and] lakes." The phrase does not include channels
through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally,
or channels that periodically provide drainage for rainfall.25
The plurality's risk management principle substitutes dictionary
formalism for ecological reality. It does not permit even a case-by-case
" Id. at 2215 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §1251(a) (2007)).2 0 Id. at 2219.
21Id. at 2214.
22 Id. at 2214-15.
23 Id. at 2224 (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)).24 Id. at 2215 (emphasis added).
21 Id. at 2225 (citation omitted).
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showing of ecological connection between a wetland and a navigable
water when there is no relatively permanent, standing or continuous
flow.26 Its principle broadly accepts false negatives, and will therefore
under-protect wetlands.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the plurality's judgment to vacate
the court of appeals' judgment in favor of the United States and to re-
mand, but he refused to join in the opinion of the plurality." He rejected
the weights assigned to the various interests by the plurality, and in
doing so, stated a different risk management principle. First, Justice
Kennedy rejected the excessive weight the plurality gave to Rapanos'
property interests:
It bears mention also that the plurality's overall tone and
approach-from the characterization of acres of wetlands
destruction as "backfilling ... wet fields," to the rejection
of Corps authority over "man-made drainage ditches" and
"dry arroyos" without regard to how much water they
periodically carry, to the suggestion, seemingly contrary
to Congress' judgment, that discharge of fill material is
inconsequential for adjacent waterways-seems unduly
dismissive of the interests asserted by the United States
in these cases.2"
Justice Kennedy also gave more weight to the expertise of the Corps, but
not to the same extent as the dissent.29 He concluded that the Corps'
categorical rule provided no assurance of an ecologic interconnection
between wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters and those
waters.3 ° He recognized the Corps' authority, but advocated for a case-by-
case scientific analysis:
Absent more specific regulations, however, the Corps must
establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis when
it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to non-
navigable tributaries. Given the potential overbreadth of
the Corps' regulations, this showing is necessary to avoid
261d.
2 1 Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
2 8 Id. at 2246 (citations omitted).
29 Compare id. at 2249, with id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30Id. at 2249 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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unreasonable applications of the statute. Where an ade-
quate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it may
be permissible, as a matter of administrative convenience
or necessity, to presume covered status for other compa-
rable wetlands in the region.3 '
The four dissenting justices embraced a different risk management
rule by assigning different weights to the competing values. First, they
rejected the image of Rapanos as a helpless victim, pointing out that:
Rapanos then hired a wetland consultant, Dr. Frederick
Goff. After Dr. Goff concluded that the land did in fact
contain many acres of wetlands, "Rapanos threatened to
'destroy' Dr. Goff if he did not destroy the wetland report,
and refused to pay Dr. Goff unless and until he complied."32
Next, the dissent credited the Corps' expertise and the authority of the
executive branch of the federal government:
The Army Corps has determined that wetlands adjacent
to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters preserve
the quality of our Nation's waters by, among other things,
providing habitat for aquatic animals, keeping excessive
sediment and toxic pollutants out of adjacent waters, and
reducing downstream flooding by absorbing water at times
of high flow. The Corps' resulting decision to treat these
wetlands as encompassed within the term "waters of the
United States" is a quintessential example of the Execu-
tive's reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.33
The dissent's risk management principle accepts the Corps' categorical
rule that all wetlands adjacent to a tributary of a navigable water are
ecologically connected to that water and, thus, are protected by the
federal government under the Clean Water Act.34 This principle might be
overprotective of wetlands, but it allows the Corps to judge whether the
cost of false positives is outweighed by the overall benefit of the rule.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Application to Petition for Certiorari).
33 Id. at 2252.
34 Id.
41520071
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A regulation based on a precautionary approach could accommo-
date Justice Kennedy's concerns as well as those of the dissent. Such a
regulation would classify all wetlands adjacent to a tributary of a navi-
gable water as navigable, but permit the owner of a particular wetland
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has no significant
nexus to a navigable water. Shifting the burden of proof is one option to
incorporate the precautionary approach in regulation. 35 The economic
benefits of development of the property for the owner provide adequate
justification and motivation for such an allocation of the burden of proof.
In a situation similar to that in Rapanos, this version of a precautionary
approach would provide more protection to wetlands than the plurality's
rule because it would reduce the risk of false negatives. It would also
provide more protection to property rights than the dissent's rule because
it would yield fewer false positives.
II. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
There is no one precautionary principle. Versions of the precau-
tionary principle have been incorporated in many recent international
environmental agreements including: The 1996 Protocol to the London
Convention of 1972,3s the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change,37 the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Esbjerg
" See infra Part II.B.
36 In implementing this Protocol, Contracting Parties shall apply a pre-
cautionary approach to environmental protection from dumping of
wastes or other matter whereby appropriate preventative measures are
taken when there is reason to believe that wastes or other matter
introduced into the marine environment are likely to cause harm even
when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation between
inputs and their effects.
1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Polluting by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter art. 3, 1, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M 1, available at http://www
.londonconvention.org/documents/lc72/PROTOCOL.pdf.
37 The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent
or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing
such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal
with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global
benefits at the lowest possible cost ....
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, 3, May 8, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 851, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.
' "Where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid
416
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Declaration of the North Sea Conference,39 and the World Trade Organ-
ization ("WTO") Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures. 4° The precautionary principle can also be found in the
law of the European Union ("EU").41 While there are variations in the
or minimize such a threat." United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 822.
39
"The Ministers AGREE that the objective is to ensure a sustainable, sound and healthy
North Sea ecosystem. The guiding principle for achieving this objective is the precaution-
ary principle." Esbjerg Declaration of the Fourth International Conference on the
Protection of the North Sea art. 3, para. 17, June 8-9, 1995, http://www.seas-at-risk.org/
lmages/1995%2OEsbjerg%2ODeclaration.pdf. Article 17 calls for the cessation of emis-
sions and losses of hazardous substances into the North Sea in twenty five years. Id..
Substances that are toxic, persistent and liable to bioaccumulate are assumed to fall in
the category of hazardous substances that are to be eliminated. Id. paras. 19, 22. The
explicit inclusion of the precautionary principle means that these substances are to be
prohibited even if the scientific evidence that their presence in the North Sea is causing
significant harm is inconclusive or absent.
4 After requiring that members' trade measures are based on scientific risk assessment,
this treaty states that:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member
may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the
basis of available pertinent information, including that from the rele-
vant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances,
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for
a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or
phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 5, 7, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493,
496-97, available at http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/sps-e/spsagr-e.htm.
41 The precautionary principle should be informed by three specific principles:
* implementation of the principle should be based on the fullest
possible scientific evaluation. As far as possible this evaluation should
determine the degree of scientific uncertainty at each stage;
* any decision to act or not to act pursuant to the precautionary prin-
ciple must be preceded by a risk evaluation and an evaluation of the
potential consequences of inaction;
* once the results of the scientific evaluation and/or the risk evaluation
are available, all the interested parties must be given the opportunity
to study of [sic] the various options available, while ensuring the
greatest possible transparency.
Europa, Activities of the European Union: The Precautionary Principle, http://europa.eu/
scadplus/leg/en/lvb/132042.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (summarizing a February 2000
communication from the Commission of the European Communities on the precautionary
principle). See also Sarah Lively, The ABCs and NTBs of GMOs: The Great European
2007] 417
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several versions, they all share the normative assumption that when a
government is balancing and integrating scientific, economic, political,
and social values for the purpose of risk management, environmental
protection is to be a paramount value.42 The various versions of the pre-
cautionary principle are distinguished by the levels of risk and uncert-
ainty necessary to invoke the principle, the relative weights assigned to
the competing interests and values (i.e. what level of precaution to take
and at what cost), and the rights and obligations of the regulated party
vis-A-vis the government.43
A formulation of the precautionary principle similar to that in the
Convention on Biological Diversity," which calls for actions to minimize
or avoid harm when there is a lack offull scientific certainty, would effec-
tively make a precautionary approach the norm because there will often
be a lack of full scientific certainty.45 If, in such a version of the precau-
tionary principle, the required response is "to take cost effective measures
as deemed appropriate," requiring such measures would be the norm be-
cause "the dominate analytic difficulty [in risk assessment] is pervasive
uncertainty."41 If, in such a version, the required response is to shift the
burden of proof regarding causation of harm to the proponent of proposed
activity, the norm would be an almost universal reversal of the usual
rule regarding the placement of the burden of proof.47 If the trigger is the
lack of full scientific certainty, a version that goes beyond shifting the
burden of proof and actually bans the activity, similar to the approach in
the Esbjerg Declaration of the North Sea Conference for toxic, persistent
and bioaccumulative substances, would be an even more categorical ap-
proach achieving environmental protection through excessive caution.48
Union-United States TradeDebate-Do European Restrictions on the Trade of Genetically
Modified Organisms Violate International Trade Law?, 23 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 239,
246-48 (2002) (explaining the use of the Precautionary Principle in the EU).
42 See supra notes 36-41.
43 See supra notes 36-41.
" United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 38, at 822.
45 See, e.g., RISKASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 10, at 11 (noting
that "there is often great uncertainty in estimates of the types, probability, and magnitude
of health effects associated with a chemical agent, of the economic effects of a proposed
regulatory action, and of the extent of current and possible future human exposures").
"Id. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)
(stating that "[s]cientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision") (emphasis added).
" See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
4' See, e.g., Esbjerg Declaration, supra note 39, at art. 19.
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Applications of the precautionary principle have been separated
into two categories: pre-emptive precautionary approaches and risk-
based precautionary approaches.49 Strategies that shift the burden or
proof or ban an activity altogether constitute pre-emptive precautionary
approaches.5 0 The precautionary principle embraced by the EU is much
more balanced; it is clearly a risked-based precautionary principle.
"According to the Commission the precautionary principle may be in-
voked when the potentially dangerous effects of a phenomenon, product
or process have been identified by a scientific and objective evaluation,
and this evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with suf-
ficient certainty."5' If this measured standard indicates that a precau-
tionary principle should be applied, the EU guidelines call for a response
that is tailored to the risk.5 2 They require a response be developed that
reflects "proportionality between the measures taken and the chosen
level of protection; non-discrimination in application... ; consistency...
with ... similar situations; examination of the benefits and costs... ;
review of the measures in the light of scientific developments; [and] the
burden of proof."53 Thus, the EU approach stresses science and requires
judgments based on individual risks.
The one federal court that was presented with a pre-emptive
version of the precautionary principle rejected it. In New Mexico v.
General Electric, a case involving groundwater contamination, New
Mexico offered a declaration from a leading proponent of the precaution-
ary principle. 4 In analyzing this statement the court stated that: "[olne
parses the Teitelbaum Declaration in vain, searching for specific facts
supporting Plaintiffs' sweeping and oft-repeated assertion that the ground-
water contamination at South Valley is permanent, or that this resource
has been 'rendered useless for all time.'"55 The court refused to give any
weight to Dr. Teitelbaum's analysis, demonstrating its view that the pre-
cautionary principle must be risk-based in order to be enforceable.56
" Bernard D. Goldstein & Russellyn S. Carruth, Implications of the Precautionary
Principle for Environmental Regulation in the United States: Examples from the Control
ofHazardous Air Pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 247, 249-50 (2003).
0 See id.
51 See Europa, supra note 41.
52 Id.
53 id.
5 New Mexico v. General Elec., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1220 (D. N.M. 2004).
5 5 Id.
56 id.
2007] 419
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A. A Prominent Example of the Precautionary Principle: Principle
15 of the Rio Declaration
Perhaps the most widely accepted version of the precautionary
principle in international law can be found in the Rio Declaration,"
which states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to
their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective mea-
sures to prevent environmental degradation."s
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration is far from a rigid obligation
to apply the precautionary principle in many cases. First, this is a decla-
ration, not a treaty; thus, it has been signed, but has not been through
the ratification processes of the signatory nations.59 Second, it is stated
as a precautionary approach, rather than a requirement. ° Third, its
application will vary with the capabilities of the parties.6 Finally, the
signatories only agree that it will be "widely applied" rather than applied
in every case.62
In addition to these ambiguities concerning when the principle
must be applied, there are ambiguities within the principle itself. The
Rio Declaration leaves several questions unanswered, including what
level of scientific uncertainty justifies the application of precaution, how
" For a summary of the broad acceptance of the Rio Declaration and the limited res-
ervations expressed by the United States, see Rio Declaration, EARTH NEGOT. BULL.,
June 3-14, 1992, at part III, available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol02/0213032e.html.
5 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development princ. 15, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
9 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty Reference Guide, http://untreaty.un.org/
English/guide.asp#treaties (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
60 Rio Declaration, supra note 58, princ. 15. Principle 15 would present a stronger obli-
gation if phrased as a requirement than as a broad approach with few explicit guidelines.
61 The principle specifically acknowledges that it is to be applied by states "according to
their capabilities." Id. This is an example of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities that is prevalent in modem environmental treaties. See Christopher D.
Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibility in International Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 276 (2004) (surveying and discussing recent examples).
62 Rio Declaration, supra note 58, princ. 15.
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the term "cost effective" should be understood, and what level of pre-
caution should be imposed. 3
These questions concerning the ambiguities in Principle 15 could
apply to all articulations of the precautionary principle because the pre-
cautionary principle is more of a creed than a commandment. It expresses
an acceptance of environmental protection as a paramount value. Thus
the precautionary principle creates the obligation to follow through in suc-
ceeding steps with specific actions in particular cases to pursue that goal.
When considering the precautionary principle as a creed, it can
be analogized to the concept of sustainable development, the broadly
accepted meaning of which is "development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs."' This definition also rests on vague concepts.6" What
is meant by "needs?" Do all people have the same needs? Is this to be
determined on an individual or group basis? What is necessary for a
generation to "meet" their needs? For example, can the present genera-
tion continue to use oil under the assumption that new technologies will
be available in the future to provide a substitute? These ambiguities do
not make sustainable development a useless concept, however.66 Charles
Wilkinson has analyzed sustainability as a principle that exists at two levels:
First, sustainability has great appeal as a broad soc-
ietal objective-as a symbol, as a statement of some of the
fundamental values we hold as a people. Sustainability has
63Id. See also Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach
to the Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 332 (2002) (noting that
.neither [the Rio Declaration nor the Convention on Biodiversityl addresses the question
as to what level of risk and which kind of prima facie evidence triggers the application
of the precautionary principle"); Jeffrey K Francer, Frankenstein Foods or Flavor Savers?:
Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology in the United States and European Union, 7 VA.
J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 257, 278 (2000) (stating that "[tihe precautionary principle effectively
shifts the burden of proving safety to producers of a potentially environmentally damag-
ing risk when there is some undefined level of scientific uncertainty").
6 WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEv., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). The World Com-
mission on Environment and Development is commonly referred to as the Brundtland
Commission. See, e.g., S. Jacob Scherr & R. Juge Gregg, Johannesburg and Beyond: The
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and the Rise of Partnerships, 18 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 429 (2006).
6 See Bosire Maragia, The Indigenous Sustainability Paradox and the Quest for Sustain-
ability in Post-Colonial Societies: Is Indigenous Knowledge All that is Needed?, 18 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 197, 198 (2006) (explaining that "[s]ustainable development.., has
been widely criticized as an ambiguous concept").66 Id. at 198.
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this appeal because it combines the philosophical and
moral force of fairness to future generations with the prac-
tical edge of being necessary to our economic and social
well-being. In this broad, symbolic sense, sustainability
embodies a shared national goal in much the same way
that freedom and equality do. Such broad formulations-
idealistic and never fully attainable, yet undeniable in
their essential verity-are critical for setting an agreed-
upon context for making public choices on difficult and
contentious issues....
Yet the truest way to understand what sustainability
means comes.., from seeing how sustainability has actual-
ly been implemented in real places. It is through real-world
efforts that you best understand and define sustainability
and how it differs from traditional approaches. 7
Wilkinson then discusses the Northwest Forest Plan as an embodiment
of sustainability in "a concrete, working policy" in which logging inter-
ests, forest preservation interests, and wildlife preservation interests were
balanced under the constraint that future generations had rights which
needed protection.6" It was this explicit consideration of the rights of future
generations and their role in guiding the compromise that was notable.
B. Elements of the Precautionary Principle
Principle 15 and other articulations of the precautionary principle
will serve "as a symbol, as a statement of some of the fundamental values
we hold as a people."69 While symbols are important to inspire action, con-
crete plans are necessary for achieving success. This subsection will focus
on practical means for reaching the goals of the precautionary principle.
The precautionary principle or approach is generally understood
to include three elements: "fully assessing possible impacts of an action,
shifting the burden of proof to those whose activities pose a threat to the
environment, and not acting if there is significant uncertainty or risk of
67 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, THE EAGLE BIRD 109-11 (rev. & updated ed. 1999).
MId. at 111.
69 Id. at 109.
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irreversible harm."7' The first two elements are procedural, and the third
is substantive.
The first element, environmental impact assessment, enables but
does not guarantee environmental protection or caution. Without such
assessments, environmental values may not be given much weight in the
decision-making process. Judge Wright, speaking for the court, recognized
this in one of the first cases interpreting the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),71 the law requiring environmental impact
assessments before certain federal actions. Judge Wright stated that
"Congress did not establish environmental protection as an exclusive
goal; rather, it desired a reordering of priorities, so that environmental
costs and benefits [would] assume their proper place along with other
considerations."72 This ensures "[an environmentally] informed decision-
making process."73 Environmental impact assessments enable an informed
decision to be made and enable precaution regarding the environment to
assume its proper place in the decision-making process.74
NEPA could be expanded to include all of the elements of the
precautionary principle, rather than just the first. One European treaty
provides a model of this type of policy. Under the auspices of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe ("UNECE"),7 5 European states
70 Charmian Barton, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in Australia: Its Emergence
in Legislation and as a Common Law Doctrine, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 509, 515 (1998).
Participants at the Wingspread Conference explained the elements of the precautionary
principle in a similar manner:
Where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human
health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this con-
text the proponent of an activity, rather than the public bears the
burden of proof. The process of applying the Precautionary Principle
must be open, informed and democratic, and must include potentially
affected parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range
of alternatives, including no action.
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, Jan. 23-25,1998, http://www.gdrc
.org/u-gov/precaution-3.html.
"' National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70f (2007)).
72 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).73 Id. at 1115.
74 Information disclosure requirements can serve this same function. See infra notes 113-
17 and accompanying text.
15 For general information about the UNECE, see United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe, UNECE in a Nutshell, http://www.unece.orgtoes/nutshell/introduction.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
2007] 423
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLeY REV.
have negotiated a treaty that combines environmental impact assessment
with a substantive provision.76 This combination is aimed at reducing
transboundary environmental pollution." The Convention on the
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context requires
the party of origin to: (1) prepare an environmental impact assessment
before a decision to authorize any of a broad list of activities likely to
cause significant transboundary environmental harm,7" and (2) give notice
to states likely to be affected.79 Together these procedural steps enable
the state of origin and the affected states to take precautionary measures
to mitigate environmental harm. The Convention also includes a sub-
stantive provision which requires each party to "take all appropriate and
effective measures to prevent, reduce and control significant adverse
transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities.""° It is
this type of provision that could be added to NEPA to incorporate the
substantive element of the precautionary principle.
There are two ways for the second element of the precautionary
principle, the burden of proof, to affect the level of precaution in environ-
mental decision making: (1) mandating which party has the burden of
proof, and (2) establishing what level of proof is required."1 The least
precautionary rule would be one that placed the burden of proof on the
party opposed to a proposed action and required scientific certainty in
order to satisfy that burden. The most protective rule would require the
same level of proof but place the burden on the party proposing the action.
In between these extremes is the rule applied by the Supreme
Court in Missouri v. Illinois.2 In this case, Missouri sued Illinois to en-
join the state from allowing Chicago to dump its untreated human waste
into a river that is a tributary to the Mississippi River from which St.
Louis took its drinking water.8 3 Missouri claimed this pollution was
causing increased mortality from typhoid.84 The Court placed the follow-
ing burden of proof on Missouri: "[blefore this court ought to intervene
" Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb.
25,1991,30 I.L.M. 802, available at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/convention
textenglish.pdf.77 
Id.
vsId. art. 2, para. 3.
79Id. art. 2, para. 4.
8oId. art. 2, para. 1.
81 See Barton, supra note 70, at 519-20.
82 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
83 Id. at 496.
4
Id.
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the case should be of serious magnitude, clearly and fully proved, and the
principle to be applied should be one which the court is prepared deliber-
ately to maintain against all considerations on the other side."85 Because
there was conflicting scientific evidence" and Missouri allowed its cities
to dump untreated human waste in the Mississippi River, the Court held
that Missouri had not met the high burden of proof required," and the
pollution continued. A precautionary approach would have recognized the
serious harm and the credible, but disputed, scientific evidence that this
harm was caused by Chicago's waste. It could have placed the burden on
Illinois to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was not causing
the harm. A less protective version of the precautionary principle could
have required that Illinois meet a preponderance of the evidence standard.
When a precautionary approach shifts the burden of proof, a three-
step process typically results.88 First, the government assembles scien-
tific evidence that indicates, but perhaps does not prove with scientific
certainty or even by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substance
can cause harm to humans or the environment. Next, the government
issues a regulation banning the substance unless the proponent of its use
can prove that the substance presents a risk less than a standard stated
in the regulation. Finally, the proponent is offered an administrative or
judicial forum to demonstrate that the substance presents a risk less
than the standard. This approach will justifiably inspire many critics if
the risk standard is so strict that it effectively forces the proponent prove
that the risk is zero.89
85 Id. at 521.
8 1 Id. at 523.
87Id. at 525-26.
88For example, California's Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforce-
ment Act of 1986, took this approach. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
of 1986, Cal. Proposition 65 (1986), available at http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/law/
pdf1zip/P65LAW72003.pdf. This law prohibits persons from knowingly discharging "a
chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity" into any source of
drinking water unless the discharger shows that no significant amount will enter drink-
ing water. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (2007). It also prohibits persons "in the
course of doing business" from "knowingly and intentionally expos [ing] any individual to
a chemical known to the state to cause" such harm, unless the person gives adequate
warning or can show that the chemical poses no significant risk. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25249.6.
89 See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 851, 853 (1996) (noting that some versions of the precautionary principle
"require [I 'proof of harmlessness' before an activity is allowed"). Cross uses the following
example to point out that this approach can actually increase risk:
2007] 425
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
The third element of the precautionary principle requires a pro-
posed action to be blocked if there is significant uncertainty or risk of ir-
reversible harm.9 This element represents the normative judgment that
the proper role of the government is to protect against potential harms
in addition to those established by scientific certainty. Ambiguity in the
meanings of "significant" and "irreversible" may provide flexibility in the
application of this element.
III. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN UNITED STATES LAW
There are at least three routes by which the precautionary prin-
ciple could be included in the law of the United States:
(1) Through integration of customary international law;
(2) Through obligations assumed by the United States in
binding treaties; and
(3) Through specific statutes, regulations, or policies that
either by their express terms or as interpreted by court
decisions impose a precautionary approach for the particu-
lar conduct that is the subject of the statute.
This Part will briefly discuss the first two strategies. However, the third
of these approaches is the primary focus of the Article and is analyzed in
Part IV.
A. Customary International Law as a Source of the Precautionary
Principle in United States Law
In The Paquete Habana9 the Supreme Court recognized that
customary international law92 can become a part of domestic law:
A family of sweeteners called cyclamates was removed from the market
in the late 1960s, when evidence arose regarding their potential car-
cinogenicity. Saccharin rushed in to meet the market demand for arti-
ficial sweetening. The FDA then proposed to ban saccharin because of
evidence of carcinogenicity. Congress, which overturned the ban, let
saccharin off with a warning.
Id. at 863-64.
90 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
9' 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
92 Customary international law is based on state practice which states engage in because
they believe they are legally bound to do so. This second element of the doctrine of
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International law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appro-
priate jurisdiction, as often as question of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For
this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must
be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
To prove that the precautionary principle has become domestic
law as customary international law, one would have to demonstrate first
that it was the practice of all or nearly all states and second that these
states applied it because they believed they were legally bound to do so.94
Although the precautionary principle has been embraced by all the
States that are party to the Rio Declaration95 and by many states in
several environmental treaties," it is unlikely that it has become cus-
tomary international law because its indefiniteness and the ambiguity
regarding its scope of application would make it impossible to enforce.
The one United States Court of Appeals that has considered this question
held that the principle had not been integrated into customary interna-
tional law. 97 The court explained its conclusion as follows:
[The plaintiff! fail [ed] to show that [the precautionary prin-
ciples stated in The Rio Declaration and other treaties]
enjoy universal acceptance in the international community.
The sources of international law cited by [the plaintiff)
and the amici merely refer to a general sense of environ-
mental responsibility and state abstract rights and
liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and
regulations to identify practices that constitute interna-
tional environmental abuses or torts.98
customary international law is called the opiniojuris requirement. See infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
13 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
94 PHIIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 143-47 (2d ed. 2003);
MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 96 (2001).95 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.96 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
" Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999).
98 Id.
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The Fifth Circuit rejected the factual position that the precaution-
ary principle is actually followed by all states and the legal position that
those states believe they are legally bound to do so." Both conclusions
appear to reflect international reality. As the precautionary principle is
new, in a formative stage, and potentially sweeping in its application, it
is hardly reflective of customary international law at this time. 10
B. Treaty Obligations as a Source of the Precautionary Principle in
United States Law
Even if the precautionary principle has not become a part of
United States law via customary international law, the government has
the authority under the Constitution to incorporate the principle into
domestic law through its treaty powers.1"' At this time there does not
appear to be an example of a treaty in which the United States has com-
mitted itself to abide by a precautionary principle or to enact legislation
to do so. However, there is one example that illustrates how such an
importation could occur. The United States is a party to the United
Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change, which has entered
into force. 10 2 Article 3 of that convention states, in part:
The Parties should take precautionary measures to antic-
ipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change
and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific cer-
tainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such
measures, taking into account that policies and measures
to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as
to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.0 3
99 Id.
l"0 The Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization implicitly reached the
same conclusion. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), available at
httpJ/www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds26_e.htm (follow"Appellate Body
Report" hyperlink).
101 U.S. CONST. art IV, cl. 2, ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land...
102 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 37.
1' Id. art. 3 (emphasis added).
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The use of "should" throughout Article 3 and the failure to set forth spe-
cific obligations, however, mean that the treaty does not actually require
the United States to incorporate the precautionary principle into its
climate policy and corresponding laws.'
The United States is also a party to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer ("Montreal Protocol").' 5 Though
it does not directly mandate adherence to the precautionary principle,
the parties to this treaty did not wait for scientific certainty that several
chemicals were causing the depletion of the ozone layer before accepting
binding obligations to eliminate their production and consumption.0 6 In
this way, the Montreal Protocol was able to implement the earlier
decision by each party to apply the precautionary principle without any
explicit mention of the term. The United States did enact legislation to
carry out the obligations it had assumed under this treaty.' 7
One could view this sequence of events as the United States enter-
ing into a treaty that: (1) required it to enact a law adopting a precaution-
ary approach, and (2) specified what that law would say, namely, that it
would ban the production and consumption of the listed chemicals. Apply-
ing the language of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, entering into the
Montreal Protocol reflects the decisions that: (1) ozone depleting chemicals
were "threats of serious or irreversible damage,"0' even though full scien-
tific certainty was lacking;0 9 (2) lack of full scientific certainty was not
"a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
104 This conclusion is contrary to that reached by another commentator regarding the
obligations of Australia: "Australia has ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity
and Framework Convention on Climate Change, both of which have entered into force.
Therefore, Australia has international obligations under these Conventions to implement
the precautionary principle domestically, in legislation relating to biodiversity and green-
house emissions." Barton, supra note 70, at 516-17 (citation omitted).
105 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
'0' For a history of the scientific uncertainty on the cause of the depletion of ozone in the
stratosphere and the ultimate consensus, see National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Reports to the Nation on Our Changing Planet: Our Ozone Shield,
http://www.ogp.noaa.gov/library/rtnf92.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
10 7 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4671-71q (2007) (defining ozone-depleting substances and prohib
iting their production); 26 U.S.C §§ 4681-82 (2007) (imposing a tax on ozone-depleting
substances).
10' Rio Declaration, supra note 58, princ. 15.
109 Id.
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degradation;"11 ° and (3) banning production and consumption of certain
chemicals was such a cost-effective measure."'
IV. UNITED STATES STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES THAT
IMPLEMENT THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The precautionary principle, which is a substantive policy, can be
implemented primarily through either substantive or procedural require-
ments or both. Three procedural mechanisms have been used in United
States laws, regulations, and policies as the primary methods for imple-
menting the precautionary principle: (1) allocation of the burden of proof;
(2) creation of rebuttable presumptions; and (3) certification of compli-
ance requirements. Each of these procedures ultimately is linked to a
substantive standard. The typical way in which the precautionary prin-
ciple is implemented is for Congress or a regulatory agency to announce
a substantive assumption, adopt a standard, allocate the burden of proof
or create a rebuttable presumption, and create a procedure under which
the assumption can be challenged in particular cases.
112
In addition to statutes that require a precautionary approach,
there are statutes that facilitate or enable agencies to implement the pre-
cautionary principle if they so choose. These statutes are agencies' seeing-
eye dogs for potential environmental risks. Two examples of such laws are
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")113 and the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act ("EPCRA").114 The role of
NEPA in facilitating the achievement of precautionary policies was con-
sidered above."' EPCRA can function in an analogous way. For example,
by allowing for a precautionary approach in EPCRA, Congress was able
to obtain the data necessary for identifying and controlling hazardous air
pollutants."' Additionally, EPA has integrated the Toxics Release
110 Id.
111 Id.
11' See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
113 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-70(f) (2007).
114 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2007).
11 See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
116 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 485-486 (4th ed. 2003) ("The TRI [Toxics Release Inventory] proved invaluable
to Congress in specifying the 189 toxic chemicals required to be regulated as hazardous
air pollutants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments."). For an extensive analysis of how
the Toxics Release Inventory data mandated by EPCRA is used, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA-260-R-002-004, How ARE THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY DATA USED?
(2003), http://www.epa.gov/triinter/guidedocs/2003-datausepaper.pdf.
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Inventory ("TRI") database that is generated under EPCRA into its other
enforcement and regulatory functions.117
The precautionary principle can become a part of United States
environmental law as a statutory requirement or through the exercise of
discretion by agencies implementing a statute. Because agencies' imple-
mentation strategies can change with shifts in political power, precau-
tionary approaches tend to have more stability and endurance when
incorporated into statutory requirements. However, some precautionary
principles first established by the exercise of an agency's discretion have
become institutionalized and play a significant role in achieving the
agency's mission.
A. Precautionary Approaches Established by Agency Discretion
The policy of achieving caution by including a margin of safety
in agency standards was critical in Dioxin / Organochlorine Center v.
Clarke."' In this case, EPA imposed a total maximum daily load of an
ambient concentration of dioxin of 0.013 parts per quadrillion ("ppq") for
rivers in the Columbia River Basin."9 The Dioxin/Organochlorine Center
claimed that this standard was "arbitrary and capricious" 2 ° because it
would not protect subpopulations adequately, given that they consumed
more fish than the 6.5 grams per day used by EPA in its risk calcula-
tions.12' The court rejected this argument because EPA had made the
following conservative assumptions in its risk calculations:
First, the EPA notes that the "potency factor" it
adopted for dioxin was the most stringent in the world.
Potency factors for dioxin used by other agencies or foreign
governments would have resulted in numerical values
between five and sixteen hundred times less stringent.
117 Id. (stating that "EPA has used the TRI as the cornerstone of its pollution prevention
strategy and as a means for improving the effectiveness of existing regulatory programs,"
and giving several examples).
118 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995).
9 Id. at 1519.
120 Id. at 1520.
121 Id. at 1524.
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Second, the EPA argues that it reasonably concluded
that higher consumption of fish among subpopulations did
not imply that the total quantity of fish consumed would
be maximally contaminated. 122
The court balanced the non-cautionary failure of EPA to consider
risk to Native Americans who consumed much more fish than the amount
assumed in the risk calculations with the cautionary nature of using an
extremely high "potency factor" for dioxin and concluded that the plaintiff
had failed to prove EPA's decision was unreasonable." Had EPA been less
cautious in its assumptions, the court would have had more difficulty in
finding a counterweight to balance against a clear flaw in the calculation
of risk.2 4 In this case, a precautionary approach not only had a positive
effect on the environment and on public health, but it also protected the
EPA from an administrative and regulatory perspective as well.
In performing risk assessments, agencies must often decide wheth-
er or not to assume the existence of a threshold below which no harm
occurs.'25 An agency's assumption that there is no threshold is strong
122 Id. (The court held "that the EPA's decision to adopt a 0.013 ppq ambient dioxin
concentration cannot be considered arbitrary and capricious with regard to the effect of
dioxin on human subpopulations").
123 Id.
"
2 See, e.g., Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 16 F.3d 1395, 1398-99 (4th
Cir. 1993). In this case, "six factors [were] considered in determining the numeric dioxin
criteria: (1) cancer potency; (2) risk level; (3) fish consumption; (4) bioconcentration;
(5) water intake; and (6) body weight." Id. at 1398 n.3. The fourth circuit found for the
defendant states even though the defendant states did not use the most conservative
value for "cancer potency" because they did use a value that was somewhat conservative
and their overall balancing of the six factors was reasonable. Id. at 1398-99, 1405-06.
121 See, e.g., City of Waukesha v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(upholding EPA no-threshold for radioactive substances); Chlorine Chemistry Council v.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Pub. Citizen Health Research
Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding an Occupational Safety
and Health Administration rule that employed "a linear, no-threshold model similar to
that used by EPA's Carcinogen Assessment Group" for determining exposure limits for
ethylene oxide). In Chlorine Chemistry Council, the EPA refused to adopt a threshold for
chloroform in drinking water even though a report from its scientific advisory board rec-
ommended one because it represented changing a longstanding policy, and EPA wanted
more time to evaluate the scientific evidence and analytical approach used by the board.
Chlorine Chemistry Council, 206 F.3d at 1290-91. The court rejected the EPA's position
because the statute required it to use the best available scientific evidence as the basis
for its drinking water standards, and the EPA's refusal to follow the recommendation of
its scientific advisory board violated that statutory mandate. Id. at 1291. See also Int'l
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evidence that it is applying a precautionary principle.'26 Two important
examples of such assumptions are the EPA's positions that: (1) there is
no safe threshold level for carcinogens in the absence of contrary
evidence; and (2) there is no threshold level below which radioactive
substances cause no harm.
EPA's position on carcinogens was upheld in International Fabri-
care Institute v. Environmental Protection Agency. 127 In an action chal-
lenging a rule established under authority granted in the Safe Drinking
Water Act, EPA had set regulatory limits on certain contaminants based
on its policy that "'in the absence of other data, . . . there is no known
threshold' at which these known or probable carcinogens can be safely
tolerated."128 Although the no threshold assumption was challenged by
industrial groups who offered a letter written by two established
scientists to an industry magazine ("the Ames letter")129 and the
statement of one additional doctor (Dr. Gori), EPA did not change its
position. 3 ° The court upheld the EPA's decision to assume the absence
of a threshold at which carcinogens begin to cause harm:
The Ames letter advanced the argument that "low doses
of carcinogens appear to be .. .less hazardous than is
generally thought[.]" Gori pointed out the difficulties in-
herent in drawing conclusions about humans from studies
done on animals. Neither document, however, reflected
the results of any new empirical studies or laboratory
experiments. Neither offered a new statistical analysis of
existing data.'3 '
Therefore, in the court's opinion, the evidence offered by the industrial
groups did no more than point out that there was a lack of scientific
Fabricare Inst. v. Envt Prot. Agency, 972 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (setting the thresh-
old at zero for the dry cleaning chemical in question).
126 See, e.g., Barton, supra note 70, at 514-15 (tracing a shift from assimilative capacity
to the precautionary principle in international instruments).
127 972 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
128 Int'l Fabricare Inst., 972 F.2d at 388 (quoting National Primary Drinking Water Regula-
tions, National Secondary Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 3526, at 3533 (1991)).
129 Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky Gold, Pesticides, Risk, and Applesauce, 244 SCIENCE
755 (1989). Bruce Ames and Lois Gold were professors at the University of California at
Berkeley. Id.
1 0 Int'l Fabricare Inst., 972 F.2d at 391.
131 Id. (citations omitted).
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certainty and a lack of scientific consensus on the question of a threshold
for the carcinogens in question and carcinogens in general. 132 Instead of
justifying a change of position, the letter and the doctor's statement
underscored the wisdom in the precautionary approach taken by EPA.' 33
Agencies' no threshold rules for radioactive substances have also
been upheld. In City of Waukesha v. Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA based its standards for radium 226 and 228 in drinking water on a
no threshold assumption.' Various municipal water utilities and con-
sumer groups challenged these standards, arguing that data from studies
of clock dial painters proved the existence of a threshold.'3 ' EPA rejected
this argument, and the court upheld that decision:
Petitioners further contend that the dial painter data re-
quire the use of a quadratic dose-response curve for bone
cancer.., rather than the linear, non-threshold ("LNT")
model used by EPA, which assumes that the risk is direct-
ly proportional to the dosage and that there is no thresh-
old dosage below which there is no risk. Here, again, the
agency sufficiently justified its choice of model to satisfy
the "rational relationship" standard.' 3 '
Thus, it appears that courts will apply the reasonableness or
rational relationship standard when an agency's precautionary approach
to regulating risks from radioactive substances or carcinogens is chal-
lenged. The application of this deferential standard will almost always
result in court approval of an agency's precautionary position." 7
132 Id.
133 For other cases in which agencies' no threshold rules for carcinogens have been
challenged, see supra note 125.
'34 320 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
135 Id. at 249.
136 Id. (citations omitted).
131 In an extensive opinion in In re TMILitigation, 193 F.3d 613 (3rd Cir. 1999), the court
devoted careful attention to the question of a threshold of harm for exposure to radio-
active substances. It adopted the rule that for deterministic effects, which "result when
an organism can no longer compensate for the extent of dead cells by proliferating viable
cells," there was a threshold. Id. at 640-42. However, the court found that for stochastic
effects there is no threshold:
Stochastic effects are those which result when an irradiated cell is
modified rather than killed. Even at very low doses it is possible that
ionizing radiation may deposit sufficient energy into a cell to modify it.
Thus, there is a finite possibility for the occurrence of a stochastic event
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Moreover, if an agency in the exercise of its discretion adopts a
precautionary nuclear policy, but not a standard, courts will not interpret
the policy as duty of care under tort law. For example, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy have a policy of
requiring the nuclear industry to limit exposure to a level of radiation "as
low as reasonably achievable ("ALARA"). "" s When plaintiffs claiming
harm from radiation from the Three Mile Island accident attempted to
recover on the theory that defendants had violated ALARA, the court
rejected the argument that these precautionary policies had created a
duty or standard.139 A contrary result might have discouraged agencies
from adopting precautionary policies.
B. Institutionalizing Caution by Statute
1. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA") is an example of a
statute in which Congress not only authorized but required a precau-
tionary approach. 4 ' The Secretaries of the Department of Interior and
Commerce are directed to list endangered species," which are defined
as those that are "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range,"'42 and threatened species, which are species that
are likely to become endangered.'43 The fact that protection is to begin
before a species is actually endangered demonstrates that the ESA is de-
signed to prevent harm, and is thus inherently precautionary. Moreover,
even at very small doses. Consequently, it is assumed that there is no
threshold for the initiation of a stochastic event.
Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
138 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(b) (2007) (noting the policy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission);
10 C.F.R. § 835.101 (noting the policy of the Department of Energy).139 In re TMI, 67 F.3d 1103 (3rd Cir. 1995).
14' Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2007)).
141 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2007). This obligation is judicially enforceable. See, e.g., Northern
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
142 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
143 Id. § 1532(20).
4352007]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
the obligation to designate critical habitat for each listed species'" re-
flects this same preventative, and therefore precautionary, approach. 145
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,146 the Supreme Court held
that by enacting the ESA Congress had adopted a policy which Congress
itself described as "institutionalized caution."14' The members of
Congress adopted the policy because of their "concern over the risk that
might lie in the loss of any endangered species."'" The Court found that
"Congress was concerned about the unknown uses that endangered
species might have and about the unforeseeable place such creatures may
have in the chain of life on this planet."149 This articulation of the risk
management approach taken by Congress is quite similar to Principle 15
of the Rio Declaration,5 ° although it omits the requirement that pro-
tecting endangered species must be cost-effective.' 5 '
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 7 of the ESA in
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill proved to be too cautious for develop-
ment interests. Only five years after the Court's decision, Congress
passed the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1987.12 This Act
amended Section 7, which requires federal agencies to ensure that their
actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endan-
gered species and which prohibits federal actions that adversely modify
the critical habitat of a listed species,' 5 ' to establish a committee which,
in response to a petition, can grant exemptions to the limitations placed
on federal agencies in this section.5 An exemption can be granted only
if the committee finds that:
" Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(I). This obligation is also judicially enforceable. See, e.g., Northern
Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 627-628 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
145 See John Harte, Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge of
Preserving Earth's Life Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929, 943-46 (2001).
146 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
147 Id. at 194.
14 Id. at 177.
149 Id. at 178-79.
150 See Rio Declaration, supra note 58, princ. 15.
151 See Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184 (stating that "[tihe plain intent of Congress
in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost") (emphasis added).
152 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
153 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 87 Stat. at 892 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(a)(2) (2007)).
154 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 3, 92 Stat. at 3752-60 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(p)).
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(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the bene-
fits of alternative courses of action consistent with con-
serving the species or its critical habitat, and such action
is in the public interest; [and]
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance... 155
The prohibition on the taking of endangered or threatened species con-
tained in Section 9 of the ESA. 6 was also weakened. 5 7 In 1982, Section 10
was modified to give the agencies administering the ESA the discretion
to issue permits that allow for the incidental taking of endangered and
threatened species if the applicant submits a habitat conservation plan
that complies with statutory and regulatory requirements. 5 ' The amend-
ments to Sections 7, 9, and 10 show that Congress weakened the prohi-
bitions in the original ESA to give the agencies authority to balance the
cost and impact on the economy of protecting a species with the risk of
extinction of the species. With these amendments, the current code pro-
visions stemming from the ESA are much closer to Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration than the original Act.5 9 The law does, however, continue to
embody a strong precautionary principle.
Although the ESA itself is precautionary, its implementation is fre-
quently not.' 60 Protection of a species is triggered only when it is listed. 6'
Therefore, the failure to list a species or a delay in its listing can defeat the
law's objective. Even though obligations regarding listing are mandatory, 62
155 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h)(1)(A).
156 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9, 87 Stat. at 893-95.
157 See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 § 4, 92 Stat. at 3760 (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 1538(b)(2)).
1' Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat. 1411,
1422-24 (1982) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)).
159 See Rio Declaration, supra note 58, princ. 15.
0 This is a common phenomenon with statutes that protect the environment. See infra
Part IV.B.4 (discussing the implementation of the Clean Air Act); see also infra Part
IV.B.5 (discussing the implementation of the Clean Water Act).
161 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
'
62 See, e.g., Envt'l Def. Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1995) (compelling the
Secretary of the Interior to act on a proposed rule listing the red-legged frog as an en-
dangered species in a timely manner); Am. Lands Alliance v. Norton, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2003) (finding that the FWS violated the ESA when it failed to investigate
whether the Gunnison sage grouse should be listed as an endangered species after a
public petition was filed); Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash.
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agency discretion provides ample room for delay. One commentator has
characterized the practice of administrative agencies as "exploiting their
discretion to the fullest to avoid political controversy."' 6 ' The struggle to
have the Canada Lynx listed provides an example of this exploitation of
discretion." The initial petitioning process resulted in a decision by the
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") not to list this species."6' Conservation
groups challenged this decision in court and the district court found against
the agency. 66 Next, the FWS announced that a listing was warranted, but
would have to wait while the Service worked on "higher priority" species.'67
This resulted in a second suit which was eventually settled by the agency's
agreement to list the species." s Yet another lawsuit was necessary to force
the agency to designate critical habitat for the Canada Lynx.'69 Additional,
and perhaps more well-known, examples of agencies failing to implement
the ESA in accordance with its precautionary approach include the listing
of the snail darter 7 ° and the northern spotted owl.' 7 '
2. The Delaney Clauses
The Delaney Clauses present another example of the implementa-
tion of the precautionary principle through substantive statutory standards.
These clauses prohibit the use of color and food additives that have been
found to cause cancer in humans or animals.' 72 As enacted, these statutes
are precautionary regarding cancer risk, but not regarding risk qua risk.
This was observed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Public
1991) (confirming that the FWS had a duty to designate critical habitat for the northern
spotted owl after it was listed as a threatened species).
163 Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institu-
tional Challenges of"New Age"Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBuRN L.J. 50,58 (2001).
" Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 239 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2002). See Robert L.
Glicksman, The Value of Agency-Forcing Citizen Suits to Enforce Nondiscretionary
Duties, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 353,370-371 (2004) (discussing the history and details of this
protracted dispute).
165 Defenders of Wildlife, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 14-15.
166 Id. at 15.
167 Id. at 15-16.
168 Id. at 16.
169 Id. at 17.
170 See Tenn. Valley Auth. V. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
171 For a summary of the protracted struggle regarding the northern spotted owl and its
outcome, see PERCIVAL, supra note 116, at 924-28.
172 21 U.S.C. § 379e(5)(B) (2007) (discussing the use of color additives); 21 U.S.C. §
348(c)(3)(A) (discussing the use of food additives).
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Citizen v. Young. 7 3 In this case, a public interest group challenged the
inherent authority of the Food and Drug Administration to approve two
color additives, where the risks of inducing cancer by the two additives
were one in nineteen billion and one in nine million, because they pres-
ented only a de minimis risk.'74 The court rejected the agency's claim of
inherent authority, pointing out the possibility that this policy may in-
crease overall risk:
The primary goal of the Act is human safety, but literal
application of the Delaney Clause may in some instances
increase risk. No one contends that the Color Additive
Amendments impose a zero-risk standard for non-carcino-
genic substances .... As a result, makers of drugs and
cosmetics who are barred from using a carcinogenic dye
carrying a one-in-20-million lifetime risk may use instead
a noncarcinogenic, but toxic, dye carrying, say, a one-in-
10-million lifetime risk. The substitution appears to be a
clear loss for safety.'75
This example underscores the fact that the precautionary prin-
ciple, like all general approaches, can be implemented in a way that might
have the unintended consequence of increasing rather than decreasing
caution.'76 Such examples demonstrate that the implementation of a pre-
cautionary approach might require refinement to eliminate the unin-
tended consequences. This is exactly what the President and Congress
did in 1992 after a court held that the EPA had no authority under the
Delaney Clause to adopt a de minimis exception regarding food addi-
tives.'77 The President, EPA, and Congress worked together to follow the
path that the court suggested was the only way to achieve their objec-
tives. 7 In the end, Congress enacted the Food Quality Protection Act to
173 831 F.2d 1108, 1111-13 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
174Id.
175 Id. at 1113.
176 See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, The Legislation Of Unintended Consequences, 9 DUKE
ENvTL. L. & POLY F. 95 (1998) (discussing the application of Superfund liability to
ordinary garbage as a negative example of legislation's unintended consequences).
177 Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1992).
178 Id. at 990 ("If there is to be a change, it is for Congress to direct."). See Stephen L.
Johnson, Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525,
525, 525 n.4 (1997) (stating that "Congress passed the FQPA unanimously... [and
President Clinton] sign [ed] the bill into law a little over a week later.... [Tihe legislation
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provide that pesticide chemical residues in raw or processed food are not
included in the definition of "food additive.""' Such residues are per-
mitted if EPA finds that there is reasonable certainty that they present
no harm.' s The amendment, like those to the ESA discussed above,1
8 1
brought the Delaney Clause more in line with the precautionary prin-
ciple given in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration."2 Today, if cost-effective
methods can be found by industry to limit but not eliminate the presence
of pesticide chemical residues in foods, the foods can still be sold.'
3. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
As the discussion of the implementation of the ESA above dem-
onstrates,1 8 4 the precautionary nature of a policy is greatly dependent on
how agencies exercise their discretion. This was recognized by the
Supreme Court in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute,"18 a case involving the Occupational Safety and Health
Act. s6 The Court was asked to consider the legality of a standard issued
by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") for
benzene.18' As is often the case, there was insufficient data to set the
standard with scientific certainty, and OSHA had exercised its judgment
in a cautionary way in attempting to manage the risk this chemical
posed in the workplace.' The plurality approved of this approach to risk
management: "so long as they are supported by a body of reputable
scientific thought, the Agency is free to use conservative assumptions in
was backed by a wide variety of public interest, industry, and academic groups," and
noting that this support included "Dr. Lynn Goldman, Ass't Admin., Environmental
Protection Agency providing the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences").
Mr. Johnson was Acting Director of the Office of Pesticide Programs, Environmental
Protection Agency. Id. at 525 n.*.
179 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 § 402, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489, 1513
(1996) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2007)).
180 21 U.S.C. § 346a.
181 See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
12 Rio Declaration, supra note 58, princ. 15.
183 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a.
184 See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
185 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980).
186 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2007)).
'Indus. Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 611.
'
8Id. at 613.
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interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the
side of overprotection rather than underprotection."'89
4. The Clean Air Act
Under the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments ("CAA"), hazardous
air pollutants ("HAP") from stationary sources are regulated in Section
112.190 Before additional amendments were passed in 1990, Section 112
required a three part process: (1) EPA was to publish a list of HAPs and
hold hearings regarding the risk of each; (2) EPA was to issue standards
for each unless it concluded on the basis of the information generated at
the hearings that a pollutant clearly was not a hazardous air pollutant;
and (3) the standard was to be set at a level which provided "an ample
margin of safety to protect the public health." 9' The pre-1990 version of
Section 112 appears to be precautionary because of the allocation of the
burden of proof on those opposing regulation, and the direction to estab-
lish a standard of proof with a margin of safety for public health. 9 2 How-
ever, this precautionary nature was rendered illusory by a Second Circuit
decision regarding the discretion of EPA in deciding whether or not to
classify a substance as a hazardous air pollutant:
The contention of the Administrator and industry inter-
venors that § 112(b)(1)(A) only requires that the Admin-
istrator list those pollutants which may result in a "sig-
nificant" increase in mortality or serious illness is not so
unreasonable that it justifies this court's interference
with the Administrator's discretionary power to identify
hazardous air pollutants.... I hold only that the Adminis-
trator's interpretation of that section is not so unreason-
able that this district court, constrained by Congress'
grant of limited jurisdiction, should depart from the well
settled rule that courts should show "great deference to
the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration."93
.
89 Id. at 656.
' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 4(a), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685-86
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2007)).
191 Id.
192 See id.
... Natural Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 689 F. Supp. 246, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 885
F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
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Over time the slow progress made by EPA in identifying and con-
trolling hazardous air pollutants made it clear that the Section needed to
be amended in order to be effective. 19 4 This history is documented in Nat-
ural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas,195 where the court noted that:
The EPA first set emission standards for air pollutants
under § 112 shortly after the Act's enactment in 1970. To
date, the EPA has listed or issued final regulations for
approximately eight or nine pollutants and has made final
decisions not to regulate approximately one dozen others.
Overall, it can be safely said that the EPA has not rushed
to regulate air pollutants under § 112.196
In the current version of Section 112 Congress has listed 189 chemicals
which are defined as HAPs. 197 This congressional determination of which
chemicals should be regulated has been criticized by some scholars:
Prior to the amendment, a substance could be regulated as
a HAP only after EPA made a science-based determina-
tion following a rigorous risk analysis that determined the
substance posed a substantial risk to human health at am-
bient air levels. Thus, the amendment substituted legisla-
tive fiat for risk assessment .... 198
Under the current version of Section 112, modifications to this list may
be made as follows:
(B) The Administrator shall add a substance to the list
upon a showing by the petitioner or on the Administrator's
own determination that the substance is an air pollutant
and that emissions, ambient concentrations, bioaccumu-
lation or deposition of the substance are known to cause or
may reasonably be anticipated to cause adverse effects to
human health or adverse environmental effects.
19 For a detailed history of the events leading up the changes in Section 112, see
PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 116, at 455-64.
195 689 F. Supp. 246.
'
96 Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
197 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2007).
198 Goldstein & Carruth, supra note 49, at 253 (citation omitted). In 2003, Dr. Goldstein
was president of the Society for Risk Analysis. Id. at 247 n.*.
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(C) The Administrator shall delete a substance from the
list upon a showing by the petitioner or on the Adminis-
trator's own determination that there is adequate data on
the health and environmental effects of the substance to
determine that emissions, ambient concentrations, bio-
accumulation or deposition of the substance may not rea-
sonably be anticipated to cause any adverse effects to the
human health or adverse environmental effects.'99
In addition to this fundamental change in the listing process,
Congress replaced the "ample margin of safety to protect the public
health" standard20 1 with a technology-based standard aimed at achieving
the maximum degree of reduction in emissions.2 ' Thus, Section 112 now
contains the three precautionary elements: (1) the preventative standard
that allows a substance to be added to the list of HAPs if it "may reason-
ably be anticipated to cause adverse effects;"20 2 (2) the allocation of the
burden of proof on the party advocating the deletion of a substance from
the list of HAP s ;2 °3 and (3) the imposition of a strict technology-based
standard on those that release a HAP into the air.20 4 The current version
of Section 112 based on these three precautionary elements has been
sharply criticized by the President of the Society of Risk Analysis as an
example of what he refers to as "pre-emptive precautionary approaches,"
199 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(3) (emphasis added).
200 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 § 4(a), 84 Stat. at 1685.
201 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2). The pre-1990 standard of an "ample margin of safety" is still
present in the amended statute, but plays a reduced role. See id. § 7412(f)(2).
202 Id. § 7412(b)(3)(B).
203 Id. § 7412(b)(3)(C).
214 Id. § 7412(d)(2). A technology-based law requires pollution limits to be set to imple-
ment technology that is economically feasible no matter how small the risk. See Oliver
Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental Policy, 302
SCIENCE 1926, 1928 (2003).
The theory of [technology-based standards] was very simple: If emis-
sions could be reduced, just do it. It did not matter what the impacts
were. It did not matter whether a plant was discharging into Rock
Creek, the Potomac River, or the Atlantic Ocean. It didn't matter what
scientists said the harm was or where it came from. Just do it.
Id. This is clearly precautionary. However, under a technology-based law, if such
technology does not exist, risks might not be mitigated adequately even if they are
significant. Regulators interested in a precautionary approach must look to other laws
to address the risk gaps created by technology-based laws. See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) (holding that "nothing in the [CWA] bars aggrieved
individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the law of the source State").
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or rules that supplant standard risk-based approaches.2 °s This character-
ization gives too little weight to EPA's initial obligation to demonstrate
that a pollutant may reasonably be anticipated to be a HAP and too little
recognition to Congress' delegation of authority to EPA.
In an en banc opinion that has been cited with approval by the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA's
interpretation of the phrase "will endanger" in the CAA as allowing for the
regulation of emissions that "present a significant risk of harm."2"6 The
court rejected the argument that the EPA can act only after it has con-
cluded a "rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect."207 The court then
explained the process EPA must apply in blending science and policy:
Of course, we are not suggesting that the Administrator
has the power to act on hunches or wild guesses .... [His
conclusions must be rationally justified.... However, we
do hold that in such cases20 s the Administrator may assess
risks. He must take account of available facts, of course,
but his inquiry does not end there. The Administrator may
apply his expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but
not completely substantiated, relationships between facts,
from trends among facts, from theoretical projections from
imperfect data, from probative preliminary data not yet
certifiable as "fact," and the like.20 9
Section 112 is a risk management model designed to be precautionary.
It reflects an integration of science and policy rather than a purely scien-
tific approach by authorizing EPA to give science a weight that does not
control the outcome and to act long before there is scientific consensus as
long as the ultimate balance is reasonable.
205 Goldstein & Carruth, supra note 49, at 249-50, 253 (stating that "[tihe central ele-
ments of the amended HAPs program mandate precautionary action that is not based on,
and in fact supplants, risk analysis").
2 Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F. 2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). The
Supreme Court approved of this opinion's analysis in Immigration & Naturalization Serv.
V. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983).
207 Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 28.
208 By "such cases," the court was referring to cases "[wihere a statute is precautionary
in nature, the evidence difficult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public health,
and the decision that of an expert administrator." Id.
209 Id.
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Sections 108210 and 109211 of the CAA also allow for the incorpo-
ration of the precautionary principle into regulatory policies. These
sections regulate criteria pollutants, which are air pollutants for which
EPA has been able to construct a criteria document including a dose-
response table based on the latest scientific knowledge.212 To date EPA
has been able to develop criteria documents for only six pollutants.21 a
Once a pollutant is listed as a criteria pollutant, EPA must establish a
national ambient air quality standard for it at a level "the attainment
and maintenance of which in the judgment of the administrator, based
on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite
to protect the public health."214 This standard is clearly precautionary.
Before EPA can regulate an air pollutant under these sections,
however, it must develop a criteria document that is so complex and de-
manding of time and resources that the precautionary nature of Sections
108 and 109 can be diminished through agency implementation.215 The
scientific complexity of developing a criteria document can be a mask for
a political or economic hostility to listing a pollutant. In the extremely
rare instances when adequate scientific data to develop a criteria docu-
ment for a pollutant exist, the pollutant must be listed21 6 and the pre-
cautionary principle of Section 109 becomes applicable. Moreover, the
Administrator of EPA has discretion to apply a precautionary approach
to conclude that adequate scientific data exist to justify listing a pollut-
ant even if the data are far short of scientific certainty.2 7 Former EPA
Administrator Carol Browner concluded that fine particulate matter of
less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter ("PM2.5") fell within the precau-
tionary approach of Sections 108 and 109 and warranted regulation.218
As the editor of a leading environmental science journal published by the
210 42 U.S.C. § 7408.
211 Id. § 7409.
212 Id. § 7408(a)(2).
213 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.12 (2007).
214 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b).
215 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457,476 (2001) (describing EPA's
efforts to tighten the standards for two criteria pollutants); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note
116, at 507-08 (describing the administrative process beginning in 1988 with EPA an-
nouncing its concern for asthmatics who might need protection from short-term sulfur
dioxide peaks and extending to a proposed rule seven years later).
21' Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
217 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2).
.. Jerald L. Schnoor, Carol Browner's Legacy: PM2.5, 40 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 4531(2006),
available at http'/pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/esthag/40/i15/pdf/080106comment.pdf.
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American Chemical Society describes it, Ms. Browner "had little knowl-
edge of ambient-air quality for PM2.5, exposure information, or dose-
response relationships. There was no 'smoking gun'-no explanation of
how the inhalation of fine particles could possibly cause disease, let alone
death."219 In praising Browner's "philosophy and courage" in applying the
precautionary principle in the face of this scientific uncertainty, the
editor stated:
Sometimes EPA has to take a stand and make a decision
in the face of huge scientific uncertainty, especially when
human lives are at stake. You may get it right and look
like a hero. Occasionally, you may be wrong and may relax
the standard later. Some would choose to invoke the pre-
cautionary principle in such cases. That may explain Carol
Browner's philosophy and courage back in 1997. PM2.5
levels have already declined by 10% nationwide since then.
Presumably, many lives have been saved. Browner has a
lasting legacy.22 °
As is almost always the case, an agency has the discretion to act
in many ways that fall between what is required and what is allowed by
statute. The agency's choice to emphasize economic, political, or public
health concerns within these bounds will be upheld so long as it is rational.
5. The Clean Water Act
Parallel to Section 112 of the CAA, which is intended to regulate
hazardous air pollutants, is Section 307 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"),
which targets toxic water pollutants. 221 Like Section 112, Section 307
changed over time from a health-based standard to a technology-based reg-
ulation.222 The change was the result of a lawsuit brought against the EPA
by the Natural Resources Defense Council, along with other environmental
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 307, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816, 856-58 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (2007)).
222 For a discussion of the history and details of this transition, see Glicksman, supra note
164, at 362-65.
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organizations, that was ultimately settled. 2 3 The settlement, referred to
as the Flannery Decree in honor of the judge hearing the case, included
a list of sixty-five toxic pollutants that EPA was obligated to regulate.224
This list,225 along with technology-based standards, was later adopted by
Congress in an amendment to the CWA. 226 A decision by EPA to modify
the list by either addition or deletion will be upheld unless a court finds
it was arbitrary and capricious.227 These characteristics of Section 307
are certainly precautionary. However, the legal standard a reviewing
court must apply to the effluent limitations imposed by EPA does not
reflect as precautionary an approach. These limitations are to be upheld
only if they are based on substantial evidence.228
Section 307 does not mention the burden of proof.229 Would EPA
have to prove its effluent limitation was based on substantial evidence
or would the challenger be required to prove it was not? In Industrial
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,23 ° the plurality
stated that "[o] rdinarily it is the proponent of a rule or order who has the
burden of proof in administrative proceedings." 23' The language used by
Congress in Section 307 supports this allocation: "[s]uch standard...
shall be final except that if, on judicial review, such standard was not
223 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287 (D.D.C. 1975), a/fd and
remanded sub nom. Envt'l Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
22 For a discussion of the Flannery decision and the subsequent history of the consent
order, see Rosemary O'Leary, The Courts and the EPA: The Amazing "Flannery
Decision," 5 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 18, 20 (1990) (stating that in amending the CWA shortly
after the decision, Congress "endorsed the consent decree's approach to the control of
toxic pollutants and wrote several parts of the decree into the Act").
225 This list can be found at 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (2007).
226 Clean Water Act of 1977 § 53, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 53, 91 Stat. 1566, 1589-90 (1977)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(a)(1)-(2) (2007)).
227 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (2007).
2281 d. § 1317(a)(2). The substantial evidence test is more demanding than the rational
basis test. See, e.g., Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966) (defining
substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. It must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury,
a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact
for the jury. This is something less than the weight of the evidence.") (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Food Mktg. Inst. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n,
587 F.2d 1285, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that"the Commission's determination was
to be reviewed under a rational basis test .... [not] the more demanding 'substantial
evidence' test").
229 See 33 U.S.C. § 1317.
230 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
231 Id. at 653.
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based on substantial evidence, the Administrator shall promulgate a
revised standard."
232
Although the standard of proof and the allocation of the burden of
proof both detract from the precautionary nature of Section 307, some cau-
tionary characteristics remain. EPA must meet only a rational basis stand-
ard, and not a preponderance of the evidence standard, to prove that the
listed substances are toxic and cause harm.z 3 EPA's effluent limitations
also escape the preponderance of the evidence standard, and are instead
subject to the substantial evidence standard.234 In addition, EPA must base
its effluent limitations on the "best available technology economically
achievable" and the best control measures and practices achievable.235
If, for a particular navigable water, the requirements of Section
307 do not result in compliance with the state's water quality standard
for a toxic pollutant, Section 304 will be implicated.2 3' This clearly pre-
cautionary approach has been described "as a 'safety net' to back up the
technology-based controls on which the Act primarily relies."237 Under
Section 304, the state will be required to develop an individual control
strategy to augment the controls under Section 307 so as to come into
compliance with the state water quality standard.
2 31
Regulation of non-toxic water pollutants is mandated by Section
301 of the CWA, which prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from a
point source into a navigable water without a permit.2 39 Each of the pre-
cautionary characteristics regarding toxic water pollutants has an ana-
logue for non-toxic pollutants. Moreover, many of the impediments to a
precautionary approach for toxic pollutants discussed above are absent
for non-toxic pollutants.
"Pollutant" is defined broadly and thus, in contrast to the list of
toxic pollutants, provides little limitation on the jurisdiction of EPA.2 41
232 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2).
233 Id. § 1317(a)(1).
234 Id. § 1317(a)(2).
235 /d.
236 Water Quality Act of 1987 § 308, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 38-41 (1987) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) (2007)).
237 PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 116, at 637.
238 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1).
239 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 301, 86 Stat. at 844-46
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2007)).
2' "The term 'pollutant' means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
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The standard for effluent limitations for these non-toxic pollutants is the
best available technology,2 41 as opposed to the more rigorous standard for
toxic pollutants of "best available technology economically achievable."242
The more lenient standard for non-toxic pollutants is admittedly less
precautionary. However, it reflects the reality that non-toxic pollutants
generally present lower risks than toxic pollutants.2" The effluent limi-
tations for non-toxic pollutants must satisfy only the rational basis stan-
dard, rather than the higher substantial evidence standard for toxic
pollutants.2" For non-toxic pollutants, the states are required to develop
regulatory programs for such pollutants in navigable waters that do not
meet any applicable water quality standards. 24' This involves imposing
limitations on discharges of non-toxic pollutants based on the total maxi-
mum daily load the navigable water can receive and be in compliance
with the water quality standard.246
The Secretary of the Army acting through the Corps of Engineers
has the authority to regulate the discharge of dredged or fill material
into a navigable water under Section 404 of the CWA.2 47 Such a discharge
requires either a general permit2 48 or an individual permit, the issuance
of which is to be controlled by guidelines published by the Corps and
24 Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A). A special category called nonconventional pollutants is also
established in Section 301. Id. § 1311(g). These are listed as "ammonia, chlorine, color,
iron, and total phenols." Id. Specific procedures are given for listing and delisting them.
Id. § 1311(g)(4)-(5).
242 33 U.S.C. §1317(a)(2).
24 "Toxic pollutant" is defined in the CWA as:
those pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including disease-causing agents,
which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation
into any organism, either directly from the environment or indirectly by in-
gestion through food chains, will, on the basis of information available to the
Administrator, cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic
mutations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction)
or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring.
Id. § 1362(13). The definition of "pollutant," by comparison, has no requirement that the
substance cause death or disease. Id. § 1362(6).
244 Chem. Mfr. Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying
the rational basis standard to EPA's effluent limitations and imposing the burden of proof
on EPA to demonstrate the reasonableness of its limitations).
24 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
2464 id.
17 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 404, 86 Stat. at 884
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2007)).
248 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e).
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EPA.2 49 The joint guidelines and the Corps' regulations incorporate
several precautionary principles.25 °
The prohibition on issuing a permit for a discharge of dredged or fill
material in special aquatic sites"' if there is a "practicable alternative"
that would have less impact on an aquatic ecosystem is one example of a
precautionary approach contained in the guidelines. 2 The existence of a
practicable alternative is a bar to the lawful issuance of a permit, not just
a factor to be considered."3 The guidelines create a presumption that there
are practicable alternatives if the proposed activity is not water-depend-
ent.2" The guidelines also state that "all practicable alternatives to the
proposed discharge which do not involve a discharge into a special aquatic
site are presumed to have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem."2 5
These presumptions are not a shifting of the burden of proof; they merely
shift the burden of going forward with evidence.256 Thus, these presump-
tions are not as strong a precautionary strategy as they could be.2"7
One other weak precautionary principle is associated with Section
404. This can be found in a regulation that is intended to control earth-
moving activities in waters of the U.S., particularly in wetlands."' As
part of a settlement agreement,259 EPA and the Corps of Engineers
249 Id. § 1344(b).
250 Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 40 C.F.R.
§§ 320.1-.80 (2007).
251 Id. § 230.3(q-1).
252 Id. § 230.10(a).
2
1
3 See Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1988). For an extensive discussion
of practicable alternatives, see Mark T. Pifher, The Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines and
Practicable Alternatives Analysis, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING
SECTION 404, 221, 234-39 (Kim Diana Connolly, Stephen M. Johnson, & Douglas R.
Williams eds., 2005).
254 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3).
255 id.
256 See id.; Utahans for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1163, 1187
(10th Cir. 2002). This is consistent with the approach taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence:
In all civil actions and proceedings.., a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such
party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion ....
FED. R. EviD. 301.
257 For an analysis of the cases related to the application of these presumptions, see
Pifher, supra note 253, 231-41.
258 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(b) (2007).
255 N.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Tulloch, Civil No. C90-713-CIV-5-BO (E.D.N.C. 1992).
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issued a strict rule that is referred to as the Tulloch Rule. 26" This rule
defined discharge of dredged material to include all incidental rede-
posit,26 1 unless the person conducting the activity could prove that the
activity would not destroy or degrade the wetlands.262 This strict regu-
lation was held to exceed the authority of the Corps of Engineers in
National Mining Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers."' In re-sponse to that decision, EPA and the Corps issued another regulation:2"
The Corps and EPA regard the use of mechanized earth-
moving equipment to conduct landclearing, ditching, chan-
nelization, in-stream mining or other earth-moving activity
in waters of the United States as resulting in a discharge
of dredged material unless project-specific evidence shows
that the activity results in only incidental fallback. This
paragraph... does not and is not intended to shift any
burden in any administrative orjudicial proceeding under
the CWA.265
This regulation, which was modified after the comment period to remove
a rebuttable presumption provision, expressly does not affect the burden
of proof.
266
6. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA")267 prohibits the distribution of any pesticide not registered by
260 Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008 (Aug. 25, 1993) (stating
that the Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA changed their regulations in response to
the Tulloch decision "to clarify that... excavation activities involve discharges of dredged
material when performed in waters of the United States, and that these activities [are]
regulated... when they... destroy or degrad[e] ... waters").
261 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(1)(iii).
262 Id. § 323.2(d)(4)(I).
263 145 F3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
2'4 Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of
Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. 4550 (Jan. 17, 2001).
265 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(I).
266 Further Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Discharge of
Dredged Material," 66 Fed. Reg. at 4552.
267 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 80-104, 61 Stat. 163
(1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2007)).
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EPA under the Act.26" The purpose of registration is "to prevent un-
reasonable adverse effects on the environment."269 An application for
registration must include, "if requested by the Administrator [of EPA],
a full description of the tests made and the results thereof upon which
the claims are based, or alternatively a citation to data that appear in
the public literature or that previously had been submitted to the
Administrator .. ."270 Although this statutory provision addresses the
issue of providing information, it does not answer the question of who
has the burden of proof to show or disprove "unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment."27 The burden of proof issue is relevant in both the
initial registration272 and in cancellation proceedings. 3 The EPA regu-
lations allocate the burden as follows: "At the hearing, the proponent of
suspension shall have the burden of going forward to present an affir-
mative case for the suspension. However, the ultimate burden- of per-
suasion shall rest with the proponent of the registration."274 The Seventh
Circuit275 and the District of Columbia Circuit 276 have both upheld this
allocation for initial registration and suspension-cancellation proceed-
ings. The requirement that EPA first present evidence that the pesticide
will cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment"277 protects
the manufacturer from risk management based on mere suspicion of harm,
while placing the burden of persuasion on the manufacturer protects the
environment from the risk of a false negative caused by scientific uncer-
tainty. This is a clear application of the precautionary principle.
268 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2007).
269 Id.
270 Id. § 136a(c)(1)(F).
271 Id. § 136a(a).
272 Stearns Elec. Paste Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 461 F.2d 293, 304 n.37 (7th Cir.
1972) (quoting H. Rep. 1125(88th Cong. 2d Sess.)). "This bill places the burden of proof
on industry to establish that a pesticide can safely be marketed before a certificate of
registration can be issued." Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. H2948-49 (1964) (statement of
Rep. Sullivan)).273 Id. at 304 n.38 (stating that since the statute provides for cancellation unless a regis-
trant requests renewal it implies that the burden of proof is on the registrant).
274 40 C.F.R. § 164.121(g) (2007).
271 Stearns Elec. Paste Co., 461 F.2d at 304 (holding that the 1964 amendments to FIFRA
had shifted the burden of proof to registrants in both initial registration and in cancel-
lation proceedings).276 Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 548 F.2d 998, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(stating that "Congress intended any substantial question of safety to trigger the issu-
ance of cancellation notices, shifting to the manufacturer the burden of proving the safety
of his product") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a).
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7. The Toxic Substances Control Act
The Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA")27s is aimed at regu-
lating toxic products, as opposed to toxic waste, to protect against un-
reasonable risks of injury to human health or the environment. 279 The
core of TSCA is found in Section 6, which states in part:
If the Administrator [of EPA] finds that there is a reason-
able basis to conclude that the manufacture, processing,
distribution in commerce, use, or disposal of a chemical sub-
stance or mixture, or that any combination of such activi-
ties, presents or will present an unreasonable risk of injury
to health or the environment, the Administrator shall by
rule apply one or more of the following requirements to
such substance or mixture to the extent necessary to pro-
tect adequately against such risk using the least burden-
some requirements. °
The precautionary nature of TSCA is evident in the standard of
"a reasonable basis," which means that EPA is not required to prove
causation of harm to scientific certainty or even to satisfy the preponder-
ance of the evidence rule.2"' Moreover, under Section 4 of TSCA, if EPA
finds there is insufficient data to make a judgment regarding the risk of
injury to health or the environment for a chemical, it can require that the
manufacturer conduct testing.2 2 This is analogous to placing the burden
of going forward with the evidence on the manufacturer, but leaving
EPA with the burden of proof to show there is a reasonable basis for
concluding the chemical creates an unreasonable risk. This is clearly a
precautionary approach. However, the requirement that the EPA regu-
late harmful chemicals in the "least burdensome" manner possible2"' de-
tracts from the cautionary nature of TSCA. This can be seen from EPA's
attempts to regulate asbestos under TSCA, in which EPA developed a
comprehensive approach to reduce the risk of asbestos regardless of the
278 Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (2007)).
279 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2007); Rollins Envtl. Servs. Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d
627, 632 (5th Cir. 1985).
280 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
281 Id.
282 Id. § 2603(a).
283 Id. § 2605(a).
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circumstances of exposure. M Because EPA only considered two alterna-
tives, namely, a virtual ban and no change, the Fifth Circuit held that EPA
had failed to meet the "least burdensome" requirement and thus found the
regulation inconsistent with TSCA in Corrosion Proof Fitting v. EPA.'
8. Certification Requirements
Several federal statutes whose purposes include environmental
protection require that actions by federal agencies must be in compliance
or conformity with state laws in addition to federal laws. These types of
requirements are precautionary because they reduce the risk of federal
agencies facilitating the violation of laws intended to protect the envi-
ronment. They ensure that the environmental harms that the federal or
state laws were enacted to protect do not become unintended conse-
quences of federal actions.
a. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act
Section 401 of the CWA requires any applicant for a federal
license or permit that will result in a discharge into navigable waters to
submit a certification from the involved state that the discharge will
comply with the state's specific effluent limits and water quality stan-
dards." 6 This requirement extends to applications for licenses from any
federal agency, not just EPA or the Corps of Engineers." 7
b. Section 176 of the Clean Air Act
Section 176 of the CAA prohibits federal agencies from funding or
approving any activity regarding transportation that does not comply
' Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Pro-
hibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (July 12, 1989).
285 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
' Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 401,
86 Stat. 816, 877-80 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2007)).
287 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 722 (1994)
(requiring a certification from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in connection
with a license to construct a hydroelectric project).
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with the relevant state implementation plan.288 The head of the agency
is given the responsibility for "assurance of conformity" with the plan.289
c. The Coastal Zone Management Act
The Coastal Zone Management Act29° provides that once a state
coastal zone management program has been approved by the Secretary
of Commerce for federal administrative grants:
any applicant for a required Federal license or permit to
conduct an activity... affecting any land or water use or
natural resource of the coastal zone of that state shall pro-
vide in the application.., a certification that the proposed
activity complies with the enforceable policies of the state's
approved program and that such activity will be conducted
in a manner consistent with the [state] program.29'
d. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
A weak version of the conformity assurance model of a precau-
tionary approach is contained in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.292 That
provision, which can be described as a give notice and wait requirement,
states that:
No department or agency of the United States shall recom-
mend authorization of any water resources project that
would have a direct and adverse effect on the values for
which such river was established.., or request appropria-
tions to begin construction of any such project, ... without
advising the Secretary... in writing of its intention so to
288 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 129, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 749-50
(1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (2007)). For an interpretation of this
requirement, see Envtl. Def. Fund v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 167 F.3d 641 (D.C. Cir 1999).
This case is discussed in Michael R. Yarne, Conformity as Catalyst: Environmental Defense
Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 841 (2000).
289 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c) (2007).
290 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub L. No. 92-582, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452-66 (2007)).
291 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(C)(3)(A) (2007).
292 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. 88 1271-87).
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do at least sixty days in advance, and without specifically
reporting to the Congress in writing at the time it makes
its recommendation or request in what respect construc-
tion of such project would be in conflict with the purposes
of this [Act] and would affect the component and the values
to be protected by it under this [Act] .293
This provision does not actually require conformity; it only permits
Congress to impose it.294 Moreover, because it attaches to interactions be-
tween agencies and Congress, that is, recommending authorization and
requesting appropriations, it is unlikely that violations will be detected.
CONCLUSION
As the examples in this Article illustrate, the precautionary
principle has found its way into United States environmental laws, regu-
lations, and policies. It is premature, and probably unrealistic, to char-
acterize this scattering of examples as a trend.
The best evidence to demonstrate that there is no trend toward
the incorporation of precautionary principles in U.S. law is provided by
legislation regarding pollution and waste prevention. A trend in the di-
rection of caution would include substantive laws requiring that waste
be prevented at least when it is cost effective to do so. There is no such
U.S. environmental law. Instead there are the Pollution Prevention
Act of 1990295 and the waste minimization provisions of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA), 2 96 located in Section 3002(b)297
and Section 3005(h).298
The Pollution Prevention Act acknowledges that "[s]ource re-
duction is fundamentally different and more desirable than waste man-
agement and pollution control."299 However, instead of requiring the
better course the Act merely declares that strategy to be the policy of the
293 16 U.S.C. § 1278.
294 See id.
29 Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 13101-09 (2007)).
29 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6910-6992k (2007)).
297 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b).
298 Id. § 6925(h).
299 Id. § 13101(a)(4).
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United States."' Thus, the "significant opportunities for industry to
reduce or prevent pollution at the source through cost-effective changes
in production, operation, and raw materials use" °1 are left as goals to be
voluntarily accepted or rejected by industry.
The two waste prevention provisions in the RCRA both require
certifications. Section 3002(b) requires the generator of hazardous waste
to certify that it has a waste minimization program in place that the
generator determines to be economically practicable and that "the pro-
posed method of treatment, storage, or disposal is that practicable method
currently available to the generator which minimizes the present and
future threat to human health and the environment."3 2 Because the
standard in the statute is determined by the generator, the provision
does no more than establish an illusory requirement. The same language
is used in section 3005(h) 0 3 with the same result.
The modification of these three laws might well mark the begin-
ning of a trend. Requiring industry to reduce waste and pollution at the
source through cost-effective means would certainly qualify as a pre-
cautionary approach. Some optimism is appropriate here. The success of
the voluntary 33/50 Program demonstrates that waste minimization can
be defined so as to be both measurable and economically achievable. °4
Even greater success in pollution prevention through changes in manu-
facturing processes has been achieved under the Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act merely by requiring the public dis-
closure of offsite releases of hundreds of toxic chemicals.0 5 However, laws
mandating waste minimization in the production process are not likely
to be enacted in the near future. Such laws would constitute a major
change in Congressional policy from the longstanding attempt of keeping
EPA out of the manufacturing process.30 6
300Id. § 13101(b).
31
1 Id. § 13101(a)(2).
302 Id. § 6922(b).
303 Id. § 6925(h).
301 "The 33/50 Program targeted 17 priority chemicals and set as its goal a 33% reduction
in releases and transfers of these chemicals by 1992 and a 50% reduction by 1995,
measured against a 1988 baseline." U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-745-R-99-004, 33/50
PROGRAM: THE FINAL RECORD 1 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/3350/
3350-fnl.pdf. The program was able to achieve its goals. Id.305 See U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-260-S-02-001, 2000 ToxIcs RELEASE INVENTORY
(TRI) PUBLIC DATA RELEASE REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2002), available at http:/!
ww.epa.gov/tritridata/triOO/press/execsummary-final.pdf.301See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(determining that EPA had exceeded its regulatory authority when it redefined "solid
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Likewise, requiring federal agencies that have completed an en-
vironmental impact statement to select the cost-effective alternative that
is predicted to cause the least environmental harm would be cautionary.
This modification to NEPA would amount to a universal limitation on
agencies' discretion and is, therefore, very unlikely.
Changes such as those mentioned above would take a step to-
wards the incorporation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration into United
States law. °7 These changes would reflect a disciplined, risk-based ap-
proach to achieving precaution in environmental decision-making. This
is precisely the approach taken by former EPA Administrator Browner
regarding PM2.5, and the environment as well as the American people
are much better off for it.
308
Has the precautionary principle made more than a cameo appear-
ance in U.S. environmental law? EPA's decision to implement a PM2.5
standard alone justifies an affirmative answer. °9 When combined with
the other examples discussed in this Article, support for this conclusion
is quite strong. The more controversial question is whether or not the
precautionary principle should be given a more prominent role in envi-
ronmental regulation. Again, the examples discussed in this Article show
that the answer is affirmative. Though it is clear that some laws are
unlikely to incorporate the precautionary principle in the near future, it
is time to adopt the precautionary philosophy and summon the courage
necessary to work for its further implementation in the United States.
waste" to include secondary materials reused within an industry's ongoing production
process).
307 See Rio Declaration, supra note 58, princ. 15.
311 See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
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